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Abstract
This paper studies a robust version of the classic surplus extrac-
tion problem, in which the designer knows only that the beliefs of each
type belong to some set, and designs mechanisms that are suitable for
all possible beliefs in that set. We derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for full extraction in this setting, and show that these are
natural set-valued analogues of the classic convex independence condi-
tion identified by Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988). We show that full
extraction is neither generically possible nor generically impossible, in
contrast to the standard setting in which full extraction is generic.
When full extraction fails, we show that natural additional conditions
can restrict both the nature of the contracts a designer can offer and
the surplus the designer can obtain.
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paper “Uncertainty in Mechanism Design,” Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009). Con-
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a robust version of the classic surplus extraction problem.
In the standard setting, when agents’ private information is correlated with
their beliefs, a designer can typically extract all or virtually all information
rents in a broad range of environments, as shown in the pioneering work of
Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992). We consider
a robust version of this problem, in which the designer knows only that the
beliefs of each type belong to some set, and designs mechanisms that are
suitable for all possible beliefs in that set. We derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for full extraction in this setting, and show that these are natural
set-valued analogues of the classic convex independence condition identified
by Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988). We show that full extraction is neither
generically possible nor generically impossible, in contrast to the standard
setting in which full extraction is generic. When full extraction fails, we
show that natural additional conditions can restrict both the nature of the
contracts a designer can offer and the surplus the designer can obtain.
The classic full extraction results of Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and
McAfee and Reny (1992) create a puzzle for mechanism design because they
suggest that private information often has no value to agents. In addition,
these results suggest that complicated stochastic mechanisms are typically
optimal for the designer. Both predictions seem unrealistic. In the litera-
ture that followed, a number of papers showed that full extraction breaks
down under natural modifications to the setting. In particular, risk aversion,
limited liability, budget constraints, collusion, and competition are among
the reasons that full extraction may fail (see Robert (1991), Laffont and
Martimort (2000), Peters (2001), or Che and Kim (2006), for example). On
the other hand, relaxing the standard setting to include these features often
eliminates other desirable properties, while also typically predicting complex
mechanisms that bear little resemblance to those frequently used in practice.
In this paper, we show not only that our robustness requirements can limit
the designer’s ability to fully extract rents, but also that when this happens
the designer can be limited to simpler and more realistic mechanisms.
Under the notion of robustness in this model, whether or not full ex-
traction is possible depends in part on the amount of uncertainty about
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agents’ beliefs. If agents’ beliefs are given precisely, the model reduces to the
standard problem, and full extraction is possible generically. In particular,
in this case full extraction holds if agents’ beliefs satisfy the convex inde-
pendence condition of Cre´mer and McLean (1988) (which is satisfied on a
generic set). Starting from such beliefs, we show that full extraction con-
tinues to hold with uncertainty about these beliefs, provided uncertainty is
sufficiently small. Full extraction fails when uncertainty is sufficiently large,
however. We show that full extraction holds in general if beliefs satisfy a
natural set-valued version of convex independence. When this condition is
satisfied, the mechanisms that achieve full extraction are variants of the full
extraction mechanisms constructed by Cre´mer and McLean (1988). When
full extraction fails, however, we show that the designer can be restricted to
simple mechanisms: natural conditions limit the designer to offering a single
contract, and can make a deterministic contract optimal for the designer.
We follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in considering a reduced form descrip-
tion of the surplus extraction problem. In a prior, unmodeled stage, agents
play a game that leaves them with some information rents as a function of
their private information. This game could be an auction,a bargaining game,
or a purchase from a seller, for example. Private information is summarized
by the agent’s type. The current stage also has an exogenous source of un-
certainty, summarized by a set of states, on which contract payments can
depend. For some applications, it is natural to take the state space to be
the set of types, although we follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in allowing the
state space to be arbitrary. We assume that both the set of types and the
state space are finite, as in the original environments considered by Cre´mer
and McLean (1985, 1988).1 Each type determines both the information rent
and a set of beliefs over the state space.
Our main results define and characterize full extraction in this model. We
start with notions of full extraction motivated by robustness to uncertainty
about agents’ beliefs; these notions require incentive compatibility and in-
dividual rationality conditions to hold for all possible beliefs of agents. We
then connect these notions to choice behavior under Knightian uncertainty,
as in the foundational model of Bewley (1986) (see also Bewley (2002)).
We show that these notions of extraction are closely related, and that the
1McAfee and Reny (1992) consider an infinite state space, and characterize virtual
extraction as a consequence.
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same set-valued analogues of convex independence provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for full extraction in each case. Our results can thus
be interpreted as incorporating robustness to the designer’s misspecification
of agents’ beliefs, or robustness to agents’ perceptions of uncertainty. We
show that full extraction is neither generically possible nor generically im-
possible in this setting, and that this result holds under both topological and
measure-theoretic notions of genericity. This is in contrast with the standard
environment in which each type is associated with a single belief, either be-
cause the designer is not concerned about misspecification or because agents
do not perceive uncertainty, and convex independence is satisfied for a generic
subset of type-dependent beliefs whenever there are at least as many states
as types.
We also explore limits on the complexity of contracts the designer can
offer. When convex independence is satisfied and full extraction holds, the
designer typically offers a menu of contracts with as many different contracts
as types. When convex independence fails, however, the designer can be
restricted both in the complexity of contracts offered and in the surplus
that can be extracted. In the spirit of our earlier work (Lopomo, Rigotti,
and Shannon (2009)), we show that this is particularly salient when the
beliefs associated with different types intersect. We adapt the notion of
fully overlapping beliefs introduced in Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009),
which gives a notion of richness of the beliefs common to several types, to
this setting with finitely many types. When beliefs are fully overlapping,
we show that the designer is limited to offering a single contract. Under
additional conditions on the designer’s beliefs and objective, we show that a
single deterministic contract can be optimal for the designer.
Our paper is related to several different strands of literature on robust-
ness and ambiguity in mechanism design problems more generally, and on
surplus extraction more specifically. We adapt the basic framework of our
earlier work in Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009) to the general setting of
McAfee and Reny (1992), and restrict attention to problems with a finite set
of states and types. Our earlier work instead considers more general mech-
anism design problems in settings with an infinite set of types, and gives
conditions under which incentive compatible mechanisms must be simple,
in particular ex-post incentive compatible. The key condition we introduce
in Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009) is a version of fully overlapping
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beliefs. We illustrate using the leading example of epsilon-contamination,
which we adapt here in section 3. As in the current paper, we argue that the
results of Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009) can be interpreted either
as robustness or ambiguity. Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2012)
adopt the model of robustness introduced in Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shan-
non (2009), and show that ex-post implementation is generically impossible
in the epsilon-contamination example. Chiesa, Micali, and Zhu (2015) also
adapt the model of Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009) to a setting with
a finite set of types, and focus on the performance of Vickrey mechanisms in
either dominant or undominated strategies. Fu, Haghpanah, Hartline, and
Kleinberg (2017) also consider the problem of surplus extraction with finitely
many types when the designer does not have full information about the dis-
tribution of buyers’ valuations. They consider auctions in which the seller
can observe samples from a finite set of possible distributions of buyers’ val-
uations, and can condition the mechanism on these samples. They give tight
bounds on the number of samples needed for full extraction using dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Instead, we consider the more
general setting of McAfee and Reny (1992), and assume that the designer
does not have access to samples from the distribution of buyers’ rents, while
knowing the set of possible such distributions. We then give conditions under
which full surplus extraction is possible regardless of buyers’ beliefs.
Our paper also connects with work on mechanism design under ambiguity.
Most closely related is Bose and Daripa (2009), who study auction design and
surplus extraction in a model with ambiguity. They consider an independent
private values setting in which bidders are assumed to have maxmin expected
utility with beliefs modeled using epsilon-contamination. They show that the
seller can extract almost all of the surplus by using a dynamic mechanism
which is a modified Dutch auction. This is in contrast to results for optimal
auctions without ambiguity, or to optimal static auctions with ambiguity,
which leave rents to all but the lowest types (see Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape
(2006)). We focus instead on an analogue of the correlated beliefs setting of
Cre´mer and McLean (1988), for which full extraction holds generically under
unique priors using static mechanisms. Our results show that full extraction
can still hold with ambiguity, using variants of the static mechanisms of
Cre´mer and McLean (1988), but that full extraction is no longer a generic
feature of the model with ambiguity.
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Our paper is also related to a substantial literature exploring the limits of
the classic full extraction results. As discussed above, risk aversion, limited
liability, budget constraints, collusion, and competition have all been shown
to be reasons full extraction might fail. Our results can be understood as
showing that robustness to sufficiently imprecise information about beliefs or
sufficient ambiguity might be other reasons for the failure of full extraction.
Another important recent strand of work questions whether the conclusion
that full extraction holds generically is robust to alternative models of agents’
beliefs and higher order beliefs, to the relationship between payoffs and be-
liefs, or to the notion of genericity used. Neeman (2004) focuses on the
relationship between payoff and beliefs, and notes that full extraction fails
when different rents can be associated with the same beliefs. Heifetz and
Neeman (2006) show that the type spaces in which this is ruled out, and
thus “beliefs determine preferences” are required and full extraction is pos-
sible, are not generic in a measure-theoretic sense within the universal type
space. Barelli (2009) and Chen and Xiong (2011) argue that whether such
type spaces are generic or not depends on the notion of genericity used, and
show that such type spaces are instead topologically generic. Chen and Xiong
(2013) show that full extraction also holds generically, again in a topological
sense. Chen and Xiong (2013) establish their generic result by showing that
full extraction mechanisms are robust to sufficiently small changes in priors,
in that for each ε > 0, if a mechanism from a particular class extracts all but
at most ε surplus for a given prior, then the same mechanism also extracts
all but ε surplus for all priors in a sufficiently small weak-∗ neighborhood of
the original prior. Our paper complements these results by showing that full
extraction can hold robustly in a related sense. In our setting, full extrac-
tion is neither generically possible nor generically impossible, regardless of
whether topological or measure-theoretic notions of genericity are invoked.2
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model
and definitions, and discuss the model of incomplete preferences. In section
3, we give the leading example to illustrate the main ideas and results of the
paper. In section 4 we develop the general model, and give our main results
characterizing sufficient and necessary conditions for full extraction. We
also connect these results to choice behavior under Knightian uncertainty,
2Ahn (2007) establishes the existence of an analogue of the Mertens-Zamir universal
type space for hierarchies of ambiguous sets of beliefs. As he shows, ambiguity at any level
of the belief hierarchy corresponds to a set of beliefs over types.
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and provide alternative results for notions of full extraction motivated by
such behavior. We also consider limits to the designer’s ability to extract
rents when these results do not apply. Finally, in section 5 we consider the
genericity of full extraction.
2 Set-up and Preliminaries
In this section, we give the set up of the model and questions we address.
We next recall some preliminary definitions and define some basic notation
that we will use throughout. Finally, we discuss the model of incomplete
preferences, motivated by Bewley (1986).
2.1 Set-up and Extraction Notions
We first lay out the basic set-up, definitions, and notation used throughout
the paper, and give the definitions of surplus extraction underlying the main
results.
We follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in giving a reduced form description
of the surplus extraction problem. In a prior, unmodeled stage, agents play a
game that leaves them with some rents as a function of their private informa-
tion. The game could be an auction, a bargaining game, or a purchase from
a seller, for example. The designer (a seller, a mediator, etc.) can charge the
agent for participating in the game, while the agent can choose whether or
not to participate. If the agent does not participate, her payoff is zero.
Private information is summarized by the type t ∈ T , where T denotes
the set of possible types. The current stage also has an exogenous source of
uncertainty, summarized by a set of states S, on which contract payments
can depend. For some applications, it is natural to take S = T , although we
follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in allowing S to be arbitrary. We assume
throughout that S and T are finite, and use S and T to denote both the sets
and their cardinalities. We use the standard notation ∆(A) to denote the set
of probabilities on a finite set A; in particular, ∆(S) = {pi ∈ RS+ :
∑
s∈S pis =
1}.
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Each type t ∈ T is then associated with a value v(t) ∈ R, representing
the rents from the prior stage, and a set of beliefs Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S), which we
assume is closed and convex. The information rent can also be allowed to
depend on the public information S, with additional notation and steps in
several places, but no change in any of the results.
The designer then offers a menu of stochastic contracts {c(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆
RS, from which agents select a contract. After the state is realized, agents
pay the designer the amount specified by the contract in that state.
In the classic setting of Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and
Reny (1992), each type t ∈ T is associated with a unique belief pi(t) ∈ ∆(S),
and typically full extraction holds, that is, given any v : T → R, there exists
a menu of contracts {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T :
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) = 0
and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
We consider two natural extensions of this notion to account for uncer-
tainty in agents’ beliefs. Both reflect the idea that the designer offers agents
a menu of stochastic contracts from which they choose, based on minimiz-
ing their expected costs. The first requires contracts to be uniformly ranked
by all agents for all beliefs, and thus strengthens standard incentive con-
straints in response to uncertainty. We take this to be the robust version of
full extraction in this setting. The second is weaker, instead requiring that
contracts are ranked only for some beliefs. This notion weakens incentive
constraints in response to uncertainty.
Definition 1. Full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists a menu
of contracts {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t), with v(t) = pi(t) · c(t) for some pi ∈ Π(t)
and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t), ∀s 6= t
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Definition 2. Weak full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists a
menu of contracts {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) = 0
and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
for some pi(t) ∈ Π(t).
Note that in either case extraction requires that for each type t ∈ T , the
expected value of the contract c(t) is equal to his value v(t) for (at least)
one belief pi(t) ∈ Π(t). While it might be natural to define extraction using
the stronger requirement that v(t) = pi · c(t) for all pi ∈ Π(t), this will rule
out stochastic contracts for sufficiently rich beliefs, and hence extraction will
typically not be possible under this definition. This point is related to other
results on the limits to full extraction that we develop at the end of section
4.3
For now we take these as primitive definitions. We show below in section
4 that these notions can be naturally related to agents’ choice behavior when
the model is interpreted using ambiguity, and also discuss connections to
several other natural notions.
Following Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992),
our main results give conditions on beliefs under which full extraction or weak
full extraction holds. We then consider the genericity of these conditions.
We also consider natural restrictions under which the designer is limited to
a single contract, and under which the designer typically will be limited in
ability to extract information rents.
We close this section by recalling some standard definitions and notation
for sets in Rn. For a set A ⊆ Rn, co(A) denotes the (closed) convex hull
of A. For A,B ⊆ Rn with A ⊆ B, rintA denotes the relative interior of
A, relative to the superset B. For a finite set A with k elements, rint∆(A)
3In particular, if Π(t) has full dimension (defined at the end of this section), then
pi · c(t) = v(t) for all pi ∈ Π(t) if and only if c(t) = (v(t), v(t), . . . , v(t)), that is, if and
only if c(t) is the constant contract with value v(t) in each state. Full extraction is then
impossible for types s 6= t with v(s) > v(t).
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denotes the relative interior of ∆(A), relative to {x ∈ Rk :
∑
i xi = 1}; thus
rint∆(A) = ∆(A) ∩Rk++.
We say a set A ⊆ Rn has full dimension if
a · x = 0 ∀a ∈ A⇒ x = 0
Note that A ⊆ Rn has full dimension if A contains a set {a1, . . . , an} of n
linearly independent elements. In particular, if A ⊆ ∆(S) is convex, then A
has full dimension if and only if rintA 6= ∅.
Finally, as a notational shorthand, throughout the paper we use a con-
stant r ∈ R interchangeably with the corresponding constant vector (r, r, . . . , r) ∈
Rn.
2.2 Knightian Uncertainty and Incomplete Preferences
In this section, we briefly discuss the model of decision making in the presence
of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty that gives a behavioral foundation to
our notion of robustness. The connection between robustness and ambigu-
ity comes from Knightian decision theory, developed in Bewley (1986), in
which ambiguity is modeled by incomplete preferences.4 We begin by briefly
describing the framework and results.
Bewley (1986) axiomatizes incomplete preference relations that can be
represented by a family of subjective expected utility functions. The main
result in Bewley (1986) shows that a strict preference relation that is not
necessarily complete, but satisfies other standard axioms of subjective ex-
pected utility, can be represented using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
index and a family of probability distributions, with strict preference corre-
sponding to unanimous ranking according to this family. Here we adopt a
slightly modified version of Bewley preferences that uses weak preference as
a primitive.
4See also Aumann (1962, 1964) and, more recently, Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004),
Ok (2002), Shapley and Baucells (2008), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Sinis-
calchi (2003), Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010), and Girotto and
Holzer (2005).
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To illustrate in more detail, let x, y ∈ RS+ denote state-contingent con-
sumption bundles and let % denote a weak preference relation onRS+. Bewley
(1986) axiomatizes preference relations that can be represented by a closed,
convex set Π ⊆ ∆(S) and a continuous, concave function u : R+ → R,
unique up to positive affine transformations, as follows:
x % y if and only if
∑
s∈S
pisu(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
pisu(ys) ∀pi ∈ Π
If % is complete, the set Π reduces to a singleton and the standard subjective
expected utility representation obtains. Incompleteness is thus characterized
by multiplicity of beliefs. If % is not complete, comparisons between alter-
natives are carried out one probability distribution at a time: one bundle is
strictly preferred to another if and only if its expected utility is larger under
every probability distribution in the set Π.
This representation captures the Knightian distinction between risk and
ambiguity, where an event is risky if its probability is known, and ambiguous
otherwise. The decision maker perceives only risk when Π is a singleton, and
perceives ambiguity otherwise. Thus incompleteness and ambiguity are two
sides of the same phenomenon in this model: the amount of ambiguity the
decision maker perceives and the degree of incompleteness of her preference
relation % are both measured by the size of the set Π.5
An agent might choose an alternative because no other feasible option is
preferred to it, or because it is preferred to all other feasible options. For a
general incomplete preference relation, these notions need not coincide. We
recall the standard definitions of maximal and optimal choices, reflecting this
potential distinction, next.
Definition 3. Given a preference relation % on RS and subset X ⊆ RS, an
element x ∈ X is maximal for % in X if there exists no y ∈ X such that
y ≻ x.
An element x ∈ X is optimal for % in X if x % y for all y ∈ X .
For Bewley preferences, these notions have particularly simple charac-
terizations using the family of expected utility functions that represent the
5For precise results along these lines, see Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004)
or Rigotti and Shannon (2005).
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preference relation. In this case, an element x ∈ X ⊆ RS is maximal for %
in X if and only if
∀y ∈ X ∃pi ∈ Π such that
∑
s∈S
pisu(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
pisu(ys)
An element x ∈ X is optimal for % in X if instead∑
s∈S
pisu(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
pisu(ys) ∀y ∈ X, ∀pi ∈ Π
In our problem, we take the preference relation % to have a particu-
larly simple representation. For type t ∈ T , we assume that for any pair of
stochastic contracts x, y ∈ RS,
x %t y if and only if v(t)− pi · x ≥ v(t)− pi · y ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
Equivalently,
x %t y if and only if pi · x ≤ pi · y ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
For agents choosing from a menu of stochastic contracts C ⊆ RS, a contract
cm ∈ C is maximal for type t ∈ T in C if there is no contract c ∈ C such
that
pi · c < pi · cm ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
In this case, it is possible that there are other feasible contracts in C that
have lower expected cost than cm for some beliefs and higher expected cost
than cm for other beliefs. A contract co ∈ C is optimal for type t ∈ T in C
if instead
pi · co ≤ pi · c ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
In this case, no other contract in C has lower expected cost than co for any
belief in Π(t).
In any arbitrary finite or compact menu C ⊆ RS, every type t ∈ T will
have maximal choices. Even in a finite menu C, however, types need not
have optimal choices. Offering a menu in which types have optimal choices
thus can be a constraint on the designer. We show in section 4 that this
constraint does not preclude full extraction under some natural conditions,
but that this becomes a significant constraint under other natural conditions,
possibly even limiting the designer to offering a single contract. Both results
are illustrated in the following section, by means of a simple example.
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3 Leading Example
We start with an example to illustrate the main ideas and results.
For the example, we start with the standard problem of Cre´mer-McLean
and McAfee-Reny in which the set Π(t) is a singleton for each t. Let pi(t) ∈
∆(S) denote this single element for each t ∈ T , and suppose agents’ beliefs
{pi(t) : t ∈ T} satisfy the standard convex independence condition of Cre´mer-
McLean (1988): for any t ∈ T ,
pi(t) =
∑
s∈T
µspi(s) for some µ ∈ ∆(T )⇒ µt = 1
Equivalently, convex independence requires that for each t ∈ T ,
pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(s) : s 6= t}
where, as noted in section 2 above, co(A) denotes the closed convex hull of
the set A ⊆ Rn. Cre´mer-McLean (1988) show that convex independence is
necessary and sufficient for full extraction. In addition, whenever |S| ≥ |T |,
this condition is satisfied generically in many settings. This second result,
which implies that full extraction holds generically, is what gives the results
of Cre´mer-McLean (1988) and McAfee-Reny (1992) so much power in many
ways, rather than the characterization results alone.
To set the stage and give some intuition for the robust versions of these
constructions we introduce, we first recall the standard argument for full
extraction given convex independence. Suppose beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T} sat-
isfy convex independence. Fix t ∈ T . Since pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(s) : s 6= t}, the
separating hyperplane theorem implies that there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
pi(t) · z(t) = 0
and
pi(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
See Figure 1. Now consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t)+α(t)z(t) that
requires the constant payment v(t) and a stochastic payment equal to some
scaled version of z(t). For type t, this contract has expected cost v(t):
pi(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(t) · z(t)) = v(t)
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pi(t1)
pi(t2)
pi(t3)
pi(t4)
pi(t1)
pi(t2)
pi(t3)
pi(t4)
Figure 1: Beliefs {pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex independence.
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t))
To make this contract unattractive to types s 6= t, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently
large so that
α(t) > sup
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
pi(s) · z(t)
Since pi(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= t and T is finite, such an α(t) > 0 exists.
Then for s 6= t,
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) > v(s)
by construction. Repeating this construction for each t ∈ T yields the col-
lection C = {c(t) : t ∈ T} which achieves full extraction.
Now let ε > 0, and suppose the uncertainty in the model is captured by
ε-contamination of the original beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T}. That is, for each t ∈ T ,
let
Πε(t) = {pi ∈ ∆(S) : pi = (1− ε)pi(t) + εpi
′, pi′ ∈ ∆(S)}
Now to extract all of the surplus from a given type t ∈ T , the designer must
choose a set of contracts C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} with the property that for
each t ∈ T ,
pi · c(t) ≤ pi · c(s) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t)
and
v(t)− pi · c(t) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(t) with pi · c(t) = v(t) for some pi ∈ Πε(t)
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Πε(t1)
Πε(t2)
Πε(t3)
Πε(t4)
Πε(t1)
co(∪t6=t1Πε(t))
Figure 2: Beliefs {Πε(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex independence.
Given that the beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T} satisfy convex independence, for ε
sufficiently small full extraction is still possible. We can establish this by
a natural modification of the standard argument, based on the observation
that for ε > 0 sufficiently small, for each t ∈ T ,
Πε(t) ∩ (co(∪s 6=tΠε(s)) = ∅
See Figure 2. Then, mirroring the previous argument, for each t ∈ T there
exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
pi · z(t) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(t)
and
pi · z(t) > 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(s), ∀s 6= t
Note that z(t) can be chosen so that in addition, pi · z(t) = 0 for some
pi ∈ Πε(t); we assume z(t) has been so chosen.
As above, consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) that
requires the constant payment v(t) and a stochastic payment equal to some
scaled version of z(t). For type t, for any α(t) ≥ 0 this contract has expected
cost no more than v(t):
pi(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(t) · z(t)) ≤ v(t) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t)
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) ∀pi ∈ Πε(s)
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To make this contract unattractive to types s 6= t, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently
large so that
α(t) > sup
pi∈Πε(s)
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
pi · z(t)
Since pi ·z(t) > 0 for all pi ∈ Πε(s) and s 6= t, and T is finite, such an α(t) > 0
exists. Then for s 6= t,
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) > v(s) ∀pi ∈ Πε(s)
by construction. For type t,
pi(t) · c(t) ≤ v(t) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t), with pi · c(t) = v(t) for some pi ∈ Πε(t)
Repeating this construction for each t ∈ T yields the collection C = {c(t) :
t ∈ T} which achieves full extraction.
A second immediate observation is that for ε > 0 sufficiently large, full
extraction becomes impossible. This follows because for sufficiently large ε,
the sets {Πε(t) : t ∈ T} must overlap sufficiently to make full extraction
impossible. In particular, for ε sufficiently large, for some t ∈ T ,
co(∪s 6=tΠε(s)) ⊆ Πε(t)
In this case, there is some s 6= t such that Πε(s) ⊆ Πε(t). To see that full
extraction then is impossible, suppose v(s) > v(t). Then for any contract
c(t) for which
pi · c(t) ≤ v(t) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t)
it must also be the case that
pi · c(t) ≤ v(t) < v(s) ∀pi ∈ Πε(s)
Thus it is impossible for the designer to achieve full extraction in this case.
Starting from a fixed set of beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex inde-
pendence, full extraction then remains possible for a degree of uncertainty
ε > 0 sufficiently small, but eventually becomes impossible for ε sufficiently
large. Given a fixed degree of uncertainty ε > 0, a designer might not be
able to achieve full extraction, even when the original beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T}
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satisfy convex independence. In that case, incentive compatibility can im-
pose strong constraints on the designer. In particular, given ε > 0 there is an
open set of beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ ∆(S)T such that for the corresponding
uncertain beliefs {Πε(t) : t ∈ T}, incentive compatibility means the designer
can offer only a single contract.
To see this, let ε > 0 be fixed. Suppose C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} is
incentive compatible, that is, for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t), ∀s 6= t
Then for a pair of types t1, t2 ∈ T , it must be that
pi · c(t1) ≤ pi · c(t2) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t1)
and
pi · c(t2) ≤ pi · c(t1) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t2)
Thus
pi · (c(t1)− c(t2)) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(t1)
and
pi · (c(t2)− c(t1)) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(t2)
Putting these together yields
pi · (c(t1)− c(t2)) = 0 ∀pi ∈ Πε(t1) ∩Πε(t2)
If Πε(t1) ∩ Πε(t2) has full dimension, this implies c(t1) − c(t2) = 0, that is,
c(t1) = c(t2). If this is true for any pair t, t
′ ∈ T , then C must consist of
a single contract. We show below that given ε > 0, there is an open set
in ∆(S)T satisfying convex independence such that Πε(t) ∩ Πε(t
′) has full
dimension for any pair t, t′ ∈ T . See Figure 3.
Thus for any such beliefs, any incentive compatible collection C contains
just one contract c. This observation also provides an upper bound on the de-
signer’s expected revenue, given additional information about the designer’s
beliefs. In particular, let pi(d) ∈ ∆(S) denote a belief of the designer. With-
out loss of generality, suppose v(t1) is the smallest value among the types
in T , and write the contract c as c = v(t1) + z for z ∈ R
S. Now note that
individual rationality requires
pi · c = v(t1) + pi · z ≤ v(t1) ∀pi ∈ Πε(t1)
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Πε(t1)
Πε(t2)
Πε(t3)
Πε(t4)
Figure 3: Πε(t) ∩Πε(t
′) has full dimension for all t, t′.
Thus pi · z ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ Πε(t1). Say there is concurrence if the designer’s
belief pi(d) ∈ Πε(t1). In this case, we can give a simple upper bound on the
designer’s expected revenue from any menu satisfying incentive compatibilty
and individual rationality:
Tpi(d) · c ≤ Tv(t1)
In this case, an optimal menu for the designer is to offer just the deterministic
contract v(t1). Note that this conclusion also follows if the designer uses a
maxmin criterion, as long as the designer uses a set of beliefs Π(d) ⊆ ∆(S)
such that Π(d) ∩ Πε(t1) 6= ∅.
Finally, for any fixed upper bound on the degree of uncertainty ε > 0,
there is an open set of beliefs {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ ∆(S)T satisfying convex
independence such that full extraction is not possible for the corresponding
uncertain beliefs {Πεt(t) : t ∈ T}, where 0 < εt ≤ ε for each t.
We collect all of these observations in the two propositions below, and
provide the additional proofs not given above.
Proposition 1. (i) For every {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ ∆(S)T satisfying convex
independence, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that full extrac-
tion is possible for {Πε(t) : t ∈ T}.
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(ii) For every {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ ∆(S)T there exists ε > 0 sufficiently large
such that full extraction is impossible for {Πε(t) : t ∈ T}.
(iii) For every ε > 0, there is an open subset Oε ⊆ ∆(S)
T satisfying convex
independence such that for all {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ∈ Oε, full extraction is
not possible for some corresponding uncertain beliefs {Πεt(t) : t ∈ T}
with 0 < εt ≤ ε for each t ∈ T .
Proof. For (i), fix {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ ∆(S)T satisfying convex independence.
Fix t ∈ T . By convex independence,
pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(s) : s 6= t}
Then there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that for pi′(t) ∈ Πε(t) and
pi′(s) ∈ Πε(s), s 6= t,
pi′(t) 6∈ co{pi′(s) : s 6= t}
that is,
Πε(t) ∩ co(∪s 6=tΠε(s)) = ∅
Repeating this argument for each t and using the finiteness of T establishes
the claim.
For (iii), fix ε > 0 and choose {pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex
independence with pi(t)≫ 0 for each t ∈ T , and such that pi(t1) ∈ rintΠε(t2).
Then there exists εt1 > 0 such that Πεt1 (t1) ⊆ Πε(t2). Setting εt = ε for
t 6= t1, then by the argument above, full extraction is not possible for the
beliefs {Πεt(t) : t ∈ T}. Moreover, there is an open set in ∆(S)
T containing
{pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex independence on which the same
argument holds.
Proposition 2. For each ε > 0, there is an open subset Oε ⊆ ∆(S)
T sat-
isfying convex independence such that for all {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ∈ Oε, a menu
C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} is incentive compatible for {Πε(t) : t ∈ T} only if
c(t) = c(t′) for all t, t′ ∈ T .
Given ε > 0 and {pi(t) : t ∈ T} ∈ Oε, if the designer’s beliefs are con-
current with Πε(t1) where v(t1) = mint∈T v(t), then the designer’s expected
revenue from any incentive compatible and individually rational menu C is
less than or equal to Tv(t1), and the deterministic contract v(t1) is optimal
for the designer.
19
Proof. The second claim follows from the argument given in the text above.
For the first claim, fix ε > 0. Let t1 ∈ T be fixed. Choose pi(t1) ∈ ∆(S)
such that Πε(t1) ⊆ rint∆(S). Then choose pi(s), s 6= t1 such that {pi(t) ∈
∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfies convex independence and such that pi(t1) ∈ rintΠε(s)
for each s 6= t1. Then for each s there exists δs > 0 such that Bδs(pi(t1)) ⊆
Πε(s), where for pi ∈ ∆(S) and β > 0, Bβ(pi) denotes the ball of radius
β around pi in ∆(S), so Bβ(pi) = {pi
′ ∈ ∆(S) : ‖pi′ − pi‖ < β}. Setting
δ = mins δs > 0, this implies Bδ(pi(t1)) ⊆ ∩t∈TΠε(t). In particular, for any
t, t′ ∈ T , Bδ(pi(t1)) ⊆ Πε(t) ∩Πε(t
′). Since Bδ(pi(t1)) has full dimension, this
shows that Πε(t)∩Πε(t
′) has full dimension for any t, t′ ∈ T . Moreover, there
exists α > 0 sufficiently small such that the same argument applies to any
{pi′(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} with pi′(t) ∈ Bα(pi(t)) for each t ∈ T .
4 Surplus Extraction
In this section we turn to the general model. We first give analogues of the
classic results of Cre´mer-McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) for the
general setting in which beliefs can be arbitrary closed, convex sets, based
on the notions of full extraction and weak full extraction. Next we connect
these notions to choice behavior under Knightian uncertainty, and provide
alternative results for notions of full extraction motivated by such behavior.
We then consider limits on the designer’s ability to extract information rents
when these results do not apply. In particular, we show that when types’ be-
liefs are sufficiently overlapping, any incentive compatible menu of contracts
contains a unique contract.
We start by developing two versions of the classic convex independence
condition for sets of beliefs.
Definition 4. Beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy convex independence if
Π(t) ∩ co(∪s 6=tΠ(s)) = ∅ ∀t ∈ T
Definition 5. Beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy weak convex indepen-
dence if there exists {pi(t) ∈ Π(t) : t ∈ T} satisfying convex independence,
that is, such that
pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(s) : s 6= t} ∀t ∈ T
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Note that convex independence for the collection {Π(t) : t ∈ T} is equiv-
alent to the requirement that every selection {pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : pi(t) ∈ Π(t) ∀t ∈
T} satisfies convex independence, while weak convex independence requires
just that some such selection satisfies convex independence. When the set
Π(t) is a singleton for each t ∈ T , these notions are equivalent, and are equiv-
alent to the standard condition of Cre´mer-McLean (1988) and McAfee-Reny
(1992).
Our first main results show that weak full extraction holds whenever be-
liefs satisfy weak convex independence, while full extraction holds whenever
beliefs satisfy convex independence.
Theorem 1. If beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy weak convex indepen-
dence, then weak full extraction holds.
Proof. Fix v : T → R. By weak convex independence, there exists a selection
{pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : pi(t) ∈ Π(t) ∀t ∈ T} satisfying convex independence. Then
fix t ∈ T . Since pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(s) : s 6= t}, there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
pi(t) · z(t) = 0
and
pi(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
Now consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) that requires the
constant payment v(t) and a stochastic payment some scaled version of z(t).
For type t, this contract has expected cost v(t):
pi(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(t) · z(t)) = v(t)
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t))
To make this contract unattractive to types s 6= t, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently
large so that
α(t) > sup
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
pi(s) · z(t)
Since pi(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= t and T is finite, such an α(t) > 0 exists.
Then for s 6= t,
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) > v(s)
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by construction. Repeating this construction for each t ∈ T yields the col-
lection C = {c(t) : t ∈ T}, which achieves weak full extraction.
Theorem 2. If beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy convex independence,
then full extraction holds.
Proof. Fix v : T → R, and fix t ∈ T . By convex independence,
Π(t) ∩ (co(∪s 6=tΠ(s)) = ∅
Then there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
pi · z(t) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
and
pi · z(t) > 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(s), ∀s 6= t
Note that z(t) can be chosen so that in addition, pi · z(t) = 0 for some
pi ∈ Π(t); we assume z(t) has been so chosen.
Now consider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t). For type t,
for any α(t) ≥ 0 this contract has expected cost no more than v(t):
pi(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(t) · z(t)) ≤ v(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) ∀pi ∈ Π(s)
To make this contract unattractive to types s 6= t, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently
large so that
α(t) > sup
pi∈Π(s)
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
pi · z(t)
Since pi · z(t) > 0 for all pi ∈ Π(s) and s 6= t, and T is finite, such an α(t) > 0
exists. Then for s 6= t,
pi(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(pi(s) · z(t)) > v(s) ∀pi ∈ Π(s)
by construction. For type t,
pi(t) · c(t) ≤ v(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t), with pi · c(t) = v(t) for some pi ∈ Π(t)
Repeating this construction for each t ∈ T yields the collection C = {c(t) :
t ∈ T}, which achieves full extraction.
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Next, we identify a condition on beliefs that is necessary for full extrac-
tion. Say beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy convex dependence if for some
t ∈ T :
co(∪s 6=tΠ(s)) ⊆ Π(t)
As we show next, a necessary condition for full extraction is that beliefs do
not satisfy convex dependence, that is, that for all t ∈ T ,
co(∪s 6=tΠ(s)) 6⊆ Π(t)
Theorem 3. Full extraction holds only if beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} do
not satisfy convex dependence.
Proof. Suppose beliefs satisfy convex dependence, so for some t0 ∈ T ,
co(∪s 6=t0Π(s)) ⊆ Π(t0)
Let v(t) > v(t0) for all t 6= t0. Suppose by way of contradiction that the
menu {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} achieves full extraction. Then for t0,
v(t0)− pi · c(t0) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t0)
while for t 6= t0,
v(t)− pi · c(t0) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
But for t 6= t0,
Π(t) ⊆ co(∪s 6=t0Π(s)) ⊆ Π(t0)
Thus for t 6= t0
v(t)− pi · c(t0) = v(t)− v(t0) + v(t0)− pi · c(t0)
≥ v(t)− v(t0) > 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
This is a contradiction. Thus full extraction is not possible.
Next we connect the notions of full extraction and weak full extraction
with choice behavior of agents with incomplete preferences. We start from
the idea that agents are choosing from a finite menu C ⊆ RS, as above, and
that each type t ∈ T chooses according to the Bewley preference relation
%t as in section 2.2. We strengthen the notion of a contract as a maximal
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or optimal choice by allowing the agent to randomize over the elements in
C. As we will see in the proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2 below, or as might be
apparent by a careful consideration of the definitions of full extraction and
weak full extraction above, this strengthening essentially comes for free. The
conditions under which we showed extraction is possible when randomization
is ruled out are the same as those guaranteeing extraction even allowing for
randomization.
Definition 6. Let C ⊆ RS be a finite menu of contracts. A contract cm ∈ C
is mixed-strategy maximal for type t ∈ T in the menu C if there is no mixed
strategy σ ∈ ∆(C) such that
v(t)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(pi · c) > v(t)− pi · cm ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
Definition 7. Let C ⊆ RS be a finite menu of contracts. A contract co ∈ C
is mixed-strategy optimal for type t ∈ T in the menu C if for all mixed
strategies σ ∈ ∆(C)
v(t)− pi · co ≥ v(t)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(pi · c) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
Note that cm is mixed-strategy maximal for type t in C if and only if cm
is maximal for t in ∆(C); similarly co is mixed-strategy optimal for t if and
only if co is optimal for t in ∆(C).
Two natural notions of extraction then follow.
Definition 8. Optimal full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists
a menu of contracts C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T , c(t)
is mixed-strategy optimal for t in C and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t), with v(t) = pi(t) · c(t) for some pi ∈ Π(t)
Definition 9. Maximal full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists
a menu of contracts C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T , c(t)
is mixed-strategy maximal for t in C and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) = 0 for some pi ∈ Π(t)
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Note that full extraction implies optimal full extraction, and weak full
extraction implies maximal full extraction. Thus we obtain the following
corollaries of Theorems 1, 2 and 3.
Corollary 1. If beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy weak convex indepen-
dence, then maximal full extraction holds.
Proof. Let v : T → R be given. By Theorem 1, there exists a menu C =
{c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) = 0 and v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
for some pi ∈ Π(t). Thus
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ≤ v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ∀s 6= t
Now for any mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆(C),
v(t)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(pi(t) · c) =
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(v(t)− pi(t) · c) ≤ v(t)− pi(t) · c(t)
Thus c(t) is mixed-strategy maximal for t in C.
Corollary 2. If beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} satisfy convex independence,
then optimal full extraction holds.
Proof. Let v : T → R be given. By Theorem 2, there exists a menu C =
{c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t), with v(t) = pi(t) · c(t) for some pi ∈ Π(t)
and
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t), ∀s 6= t
Thus
v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ≤ v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t) ∀s 6= t
Now for any mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆(C),
v(t)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(pi(t) · c) =
∑
c∈C
σ(c)(v(t)−pi(t) · c) ≤ v(t)−pi(t) · c(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
Thus c(t) is mixed-strategy optimal for t in C.
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Corollary 3. Optimal full extraction holds only if beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈
T} do not satisfy convex dependence.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Theorem 3. Suppose beliefs satisfy
convex dependence, so for some t0 ∈ T ,
co(∪s 6=t0Π(s)) ⊆ Π(t0)
Let v(t) > v(t0) for all t 6= t0. Suppose by way of contradiction that the
menu {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} achieves optimal full extraction. Then for t0,
v(t0)− pi · c(t0) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t0)
while for t 6= t0,
v(t)− pi · c(t0) ≤ v(t)− pi · c(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
and
v(t)− pi · c(t) = 0 for some pi ∈ Π(t)
Putting these together, for t 6= t0 there must be some pi ∈ Π(t) such that
v(t)− pi · c(t0) ≤ 0.
But for t 6= t0,
Π(t) ⊆ co(∪s 6=t0Π(s)) ⊆ Π(t0)
Thus for t 6= t0,
v(t)− pi · c(t0) = v(t)− v(t0) + v(t0)− pi · c(t0)
≥ v(t)− v(t0) > 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
This is a contradiction. Thus optimal full extraction is not possible.
We close this section with some results on the limits to full extraction
when convex independence fails. We identify a natural condition under which
incentive compatibility limits the variation in contracts that the designer can
offer, in some cases limiting the designer to a single contract.
We start with a general definition of incentive compatibility in this setting.
The menu C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} is incentive compatible if for each t ∈ T :
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ∀pi ∈ Π(t), ∀s 6= t
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If T ∗ ⊆ T , say a menu C∗ = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T ∗} is incentive compatible for
T ∗ if for all t ∈ T ∗:
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ v(t)− pi(t) · c(s) ∀pi ∈ Π(t), ∀s ∈ T ∗
Similarly, say C∗ is individually rational if for all t ∈ T ∗,
v(t)− pi(t) · c(t) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
Note that these notions of incentive compatibility and individual rationality
are consistent with the robust version implicit in the definition of full ex-
traction, and, as in optimal full extraction, with providing agents stronger
incentives in the form of optimal choices rather than maximal choices.
Next we consider a natural condition on the richness of beliefs shared by
different types.
Definition 10. Beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} are fully overlapping if for
each t, t′ ∈ T , Π(t) ∩ Π(t′) has full dimension.
When beliefs are fully overlapping, incentive compatibility imposes signif-
icant restrictions on possible menus of contracts, since incentive compatibility
requires that two contracts c(t) and c(t′) must have the same expected value
according to any belief pi that is shared by types t and t′. When the set of
such shared beliefs is sufficiently rich, this observation forces c(t) and c(t′) to
be the same. This observation in turn yields the following result.
Theorem 4. Suppose C = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T} is incentive compatible.
(i) If Π(t) ∩Π(t′) has full dimension, then c(t) = c(t′).
(ii) If beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} are fully overlapping then c(t) = c(t′)
for all t, t′ ∈ T .
(iii) If Π(t) ∩ Π(t′) has full dimension for each t, t′ ∈ T ∗ ⊆ T and C∗ =
{c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T ∗} is incentive compatible for T ∗, then c(t) = c(t′)
for all t, t′ ∈ T ∗.
Proof. For (i), fix t, t′ ∈ T with t 6= t′. Since C is incentive compatible,
v(t)− pi · c(t′) ≤ v(t)− pi · c(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
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and
v(t′)− pi · c(t) ≤ v(t′)− pi · c(t′) ∀pi ∈ Π(t′)
Thus
pi · c(t′) ≥ pi · c(t) ∀pi ∈ Π(t)
and
pi · c(t) ≥ pi · c(t′) ∀pi ∈ Π(t′)
Putting these together,
pi · (c(t)− c(t′)) = 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t) ∩ Π(t′)
Since Π(t) ∩Π(t′) has full dimension, this implies c(t) = c(t′).
Then (ii) follows from (i), since if beliefs are fully overlapping then Π(t)∩
Π(t′) has full dimension for any t, t′ ∈ T , which implies that c(t) = c(t′) for
all t, t′ ∈ T . Similarly, (iii) follows from the argument used to prove (i).
Note that (ii) above also holds under a weaker condition on beliefs, pro-
vided only that there is some indexing T = {t1, . . . , tT} such that Π(ti) ∩
Π(ti+1) has full dimension for each i = 1, . . . , T − 1; similarly, (iii) holds
under an analogous weakening applied to the subset T ∗ ⊆ T .
Thus even if the designer chooses to offer a smaller menu of contracts, for
example by forgoing individual rationality for some types with lower values
to focus on extracting more surplus from types with higher values, these
results imply that the designer must always offer the same contract to any
pair of types sharing a set of beliefs of full dimension, and when beliefs
are fully overlapping the designer can offer at most one contract. With some
additional information about the designer’s beliefs pi(d) ∈ ∆(S), these results
lead to sharp predictions regarding the designer’s optimal menu of contracts.
Although these results require additional restrictions that we do not focus
on otherwise, they might have some independent interest. Thus we record
these results next.
Theorem 5. Suppose beliefs {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} are fully overlapping.
Let T ∗ ⊆ T , and let t1 ∈ T
∗ satisfy v(t1) = mint∈T ∗ v(t). If pi(d) ∈ Π(t1), then
the deterministic contract v(t1) maximizes the designer’s expected revenue
among all menus C∗ = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T ∗} that are incentive compatible
and individually rational for T ∗.
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Proof. Let C∗ = {c(t) ∈ RS : t ∈ T ∗} be incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational for T ∗ ⊆ T . By part (iii) of Theorem 4, c(t) = c(t′) = c(t1) for
all t, t′ ∈ T ∗. Since C∗ is individually rational,
v(t1)− pi · c(t1) ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π(t1)
Thus
pi · c(t1) ≤ v(t1) ∀pi ∈ Π(t1)
If pi(d) ∈ Π(t1), this implies pi(d) · c(t1) ≤ v(t1). Now note that the menu
in which c(t) = v(t1) for each t ∈ T
∗ is incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational. Thus the deterministic contract v(t1) maximizes the designer’s
expected revenue among all such menus.
Note that similar conclusions follow if the designer has a set of beliefs
Π(d) ⊆ ∆(S). In that case, the deterministic contract v(t1) is optimal for
the designer among all menus that are incentive compatible and individually
rational for T ∗, provided Π(d) ⊆ Π(t1). If instead the designer uses a maxmin
criterion, then the deterministic contract v(t1) maximizes the designer’s min-
imum expected revenue among all menus that are incentive compatible and
individually rational for T ∗ as long as Π(d) ∩Π(t1) 6= ∅.
5 Genericity of Full Extraction
In this section we investigate the robustness of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for full extraction we identified in the previous section. The work
of Cre´mer and McLean (1988) and others uncovered the connection between
correlated beliefs and full extraction in standard Bayesian mechanism design.
Perhaps the most powerful and negative aspect of this work was showing that
these conditions are generic in an appropriate sense. Related work showed
that these generic conditions lead to full extraction in a wide array of settings
with private information.
We seek a similar measure of the extent of full rent extraction and the
existence of information rents for robust notions of incentive compatibility.
To formalize this discussion, suppose |S| ≥ |T |. Recall that in the standard
Bayesian setting, each type t ∈ T is associated with a unique conditional
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distribution pi(t) ∈ ∆(S), and when T and S are finite, full extraction is pos-
sible if and only if the collection {pi(t) : t ∈ T} satisfies convex independence.
In this case, it is straightforward to see that the subset of ∆(S)T on which
this condition is satisfied is an open set of full Lebesgue measure.
In our setting, each type t is associated with a set Π(t) drawn from
B = {Π ⊆ ∆(S) : Π is closed and convex}
and full extraction is characterized in terms of conditions on the collection
{Π(t) : t ∈ T} ⊆ BT . To gauge how widespread the absence of information
rents is in this setting, we seek to measure the size of the subset of BT
on which the various conditions characterizing full extraction and weak full
extraction hold.
To make this precise, we endow B with the Hausdorff topology, and BT
with the product topology. Let W denote the subset of BT satisfying weak
convex independence, I denote the subset of BT satisfying convex indepen-
dence, and D denote the subset of BT satisfying convex dependence. Thus
W is a set on which weak full extraction is always possible. Similarly, I is a
set of beliefs for which full extraction is always possible, and D is a set for
which full extraction is never possible.
The set BT is infinite-dimensional, even when S and T are finite. Thus
the issue of measuring the sizes of these sets is not straightforward due to
the absence of a natural analogue of Lebesgue measure in infinite-dimensional
spaces. Genericity in these cases is typically defined either using topological
notions, such as open and dense or residual, or using measure-theoretic no-
tions such as prevalence. Prevalence and its complement, shyness, developed
by Christensen (1974) and Hunt, Sauer, and Yorke (1992), and made relative
by Anderson and Zame (2001), are analogues of Lebesgue measure and full
Lebesgue measure that more closely mimic properties of Lebesgue measure
in many problems.6 We first give formal definitions, and then discuss some
important properties shared by these notions of genericity.
Because we are interested in the relative size of subsets of BT , we use the
relative notions of prevalence and shyness developed by Anderson and Zame
6Well-known problems with interpreting topological notions of genericity are illustrated
by simple examples of open and dense sets in Rn having arbitrarily small Lebesgue mea-
sure, and residual sets of Lebesgue measure 0.
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(2001) for use in a convex subset which may be a shy subset of the ambient
space. The formal definitions are given below.
Definition 11. Let Z be a topological vector space and let C ⊆ Z be
a convex Borel subset of Z which is completely metrizable in the relative
topology. Let c ∈ C. A universally measurable subset E ⊆ Z is shy in
C at c if for each δ > 0 and each neighborhood W of 0 in Z, there is a
regular Borel probability measure µ on Z with compact support such that
supp µ ⊆ (δ(C−c)+c)∩(W +c) and µ(E+z) = 0 for every z ∈ Z.7 The set
E is shy in C if it is shy at each point c ∈ C. A (not necessarily universally
measurable) subset F ⊆ C is shy in C if it is contained in a shy universally
measurable set. A subset K ⊆ C is prevalent in C if its complement C \K
is shy in C.
Like Lebesgue measure 0, relative shyness and prevalence have many
properties desirable for measure-theoretic notions of “smallness” and “large-
ness”: relative shyness is translation invariant, preserved under countable
unions, and coincides with Lebesgue measure 0 in Rn, and no relatively
open set is relatively shy.
We note a simple but important property common to both residual and
relative prevalence as notions of genericity with respect to subsets of BT .
Lemma 1. Let X ⊆ BT be universally measurable. If Xc = BT \ X has a
non-empty relative interior, then X is neither residual nor relatively prevalent
in BT .
Proof. For relative prevalence the result is immediate from the definitions
and the fact that no relatively open set is relatively shy. To see that X is
not residual in BT , note that BT is a compact metric space, hence a Baire
space. The conclusion then follows immediately from the Baire Category
Theorem.
From this simple observation, we conclude that full extraction is neither
generically possible nor generically impossible. Similarly, optimal full extrac-
tion is neither generically possible nor generically impossible.
7A set E ⊆ Y is universally measurable if for every Borel measure η on Y , E belongs
to the completion with respect to η of the sigma algebra of Borel sets.
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Theorem 6. Let |S| ≥ |T |. Neither I nor D is residual in BT . Neither I
nor D is relatively prevalent in BT .
Proof. Both I and D are Borel sets, hence are universally measurable. By
definition, I ∩ D = ∅, so I ⊆ Dc and D ⊆ Ic. The results will all follow
provided both I and D have non-empty relative interior. In both cases, we
will establish this by constructing relative interior points.
First consider I. Choose {pi(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T} such that pi(t) 6∈ co{pi(t′) :
t′ 6= t} for each t, that is, such that {{pi(t)} : t ∈ T} satisfies convex inde-
pendence. Choose ε > 0 such that
∀t ∈ T : Bε(pi(t)) ∩ co (∪t′ 6=tBε(pi(t
′))) = ∅
that is, such that {Bε(pi(t)) : t ∈ T} also satisfies convex independence.
8
Now if Π ∈ B and d(Π, {pi(t)}) < ε, then Π ⊆ Bε(pi(t)).
9 Thus any collection
{Π(t) ∈ B : t ∈ T} such that d(Π(t), {pi(t)}) < ε for each t must satisfy
convex independence as well. From this we conclude that {{pi(t)} : t ∈ T} is
a relative interior point of I.
Next, consider D. Fix t0 ∈ T . Choose Π(t0) ∈ B such that rintΠ(t0) 6= ∅.
Fix ε > 0 and choose p¯i(t0) ∈ rintΠ(t0) such that Bε(p¯i(t0)) ⊆ Π(t0). Now
choose {Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S) : t ∈ T \ {t0}} such that
co(∪t6=t0Π(t)) ⊆ Bε/4(p¯i(t0))
In particular then, {Π(t) : t ∈ T} satisfies convex dependence, so the collec-
tion {Π(t) : t ∈ T} ∈ D.
If {Π¯(t) ∈ B : t ∈ T \{t0}} is any collection such that d(Π¯(t),Π(t)) < ε/4
for each t 6= t0, then
co(∪t6=t0Π¯(t)) ⊆ Bε/2(p¯i(t0))
8As in section 3, here for pi ∈ ∆(S) and β > 0, Bβ(pi) denotes the ball of radius β
about pi in ∆(S), so Bβ(pi) = {pi′ ∈ ∆(S) : ‖pi′ − pi‖ < β}.
9Here d(A,B) denotes the Hausdorff distance between A,B ∈ B, defined by
d(A,B) = max
{
sup
x∈A
dist(x,B), sup
y∈B
dist(y,A)
}
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Finally, if Π ∈ B and d(Π,Π(t0)) < ε/2, then Bε/2(p¯i(t0)) ⊆ Π. Putting
these observations together, any collection {Π¯(t) ∈ B : t ∈ T} such that
d(Π¯(t0),Π(t0)) < ε/2 and d(Π¯(t),Π(t)) < ε/4 for each t 6= t0 will also satisfy
convex dependence, and hence belongs to D.
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